This question touches on Islamic criminal law (fiqh al-jināyāt), not theology or morality in the abstract. Much confusion arises when legal classifications are mistaken for moral value judgments.
Let us address each issue step by step but before we do that, if the question of the existence of slavery in the first place comes to mind, then this is a must read before the following is read.
Did the four madhhabs/schools of thought hold that a master Is not killed for killing his slave?
Yes, classically, the four Sunni madhhabs (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī) generally held that qisāṣ (retaliatory execution) is not applied if a master kills his own slave.
This position is based on legal reasoning and specific narrations, including the hadith reported in Sunan Ibn Majah (2660): “A believer is not killed for a disbeliever, nor a master for his slave.”
However, this does not mean:
- The killing was lawful[1]
- The master goes unpunished[2]
- Islam considered the slave’s life worthless[3]
Rather, it means qisāṣ specifically was not applied in this case.
Instead, severe punishments still applied:
- Taʿzīr (discretionary punishment)[4]
- Financial compensation (diyah)[5]
- Expiation (kaffārah)[6]
- In some views, imprisonment or exile[7]
The act was considered a grave sin and a criminal offense, just not one triggering mandatory retaliation.
There are, however, scholarly opinions stating that a master may be killed for killing his slave. A well-known report states that ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (رضي الله عنه) ordered qiṣāṣ against a master who killed his slave.[8]
Why would scholars go against an explicit hadith? This piece is highly recommended for a detailed discussion on this question.
Ibn Ḥazm explicitly ruled that qiṣāṣ applies if a master kills his slave. He rejected the ḥadīth “nor a master for his slave” as weak or misapplied. He argued that Qur’anic universality overrides juristic distinctions. His argument: “A soul for a soul” (Q.5:45) applies universally unless explicitly excluded.[9]
Some early tābiʿūn (students of the companions), such as al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, held that intentional killing warrants qiṣāṣ regardless of ownership. These views did not crystallize into a school of thought, but they are cited by later jurists as early ethical-legal positions.[10][11]
It should be noted that this was not a unanimous position. Ibn Ḥazm held that qiṣāṣ applies if a master kills his slave, citing the Qur’anic principle of “a soul for a soul” (Q 5:45). Reports from ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb also indicate that he ordered retaliation in such a case. Likewise, Abū Ḥanīfah held that a Muslim may be executed for killing a protected non-Muslim (dhimmī), grounding qiṣāṣ in legal inviolability rather than religious identity. These views demonstrate that the majority position reflects juristic classification rather than an uncontested moral axiom.
Why was Qisāṣ not applied? (Legal reasoning, not moral ranking)
Qisāṣ in Islamic law is not based purely on moral worth, but on legal parity (takāfuʾ) between parties.
Historically:
- Slaves were legally dependent persons under a household structure[12]
- Qisāṣ required complete legal equivalence between killer and victim[13]
- The master was legally responsible for the slave’s maintenance, liability, and protection[14]
This legal framework existed within a transitional system that Islam restricted, humanized, and gradually dismantled, not one it created or endorsed as an ideal.
Importantly:
- Islam expanded the rights of slaves[15]
- Encouraged manumission repeatedly[16]
- Made freeing slaves an expiation for sins[17]
- Categorically condemned abuse and killing[18]
The legal distinction reflects how law operated in that society, not a statement that the slave’s life was worth less before Allah (ﷻ).
Ibn Kathīr and the issue of killing a Muslim for a non-Muslim
Ibn Kathir, in his tafsīr of Surah al-Mā’idah (Q.5:45), reports that the majority of early scholars held that a Muslim is not executed for killing a kāfir.[19]
This opinion was primarily based on:
- Certain hadith
- Early legal precedent
- The idea of legal equality as defined by covenant and citizenship, not belief alone
However, this was never unanimous, and it was contextual. Many scholars, especially later jurists, restricted this ruling to:
They did not apply it to:
- Dhimmi (protected non-Muslim citizens)
- Muʿāhad (treaty-protected persons)
- Mustaʾmin (guests under protection)
In fact, many jurists explicitly ruled that a Muslim is executed if he kills a protected non-Muslim unjustly.
Does this contradict the Qur’anic command of justice and equity?
No; but only if the Qur’an is read holistically, not selectively. The Qur’an states: “O you who believe, be persistently standing firm for justice…” (Q.4:135) and: “Whoever kills a soul unjustly – it is as if he has killed all mankind.” (Q.5:32)
Justice in Islam includes:
Qisāṣ is one mechanism of justice, not its entirety. When qisāṣ was not applied, other punishments still ensured justice, deterrence, and accountability.
Justice ≠ identical punishment in every case
Justice = appropriate punishment within a legal framework
Indeed, Allah (ﷻ) knows best.
References and footnotes:
[1] Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 8 (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2004), 314: “There is no disagreement that killing a slave unjustly is forbidden (ḥarām).” | Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-Mujtahid, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, n.d.), 401.
[2] al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 26 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1993), 134 | al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, vol. 6 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, n.d.), 152.
[3] Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 8, 316: “The absence of qisāṣ does not imply permissibility nor lack of sanctity.” | Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, vol. 12 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1379 AH), 208.
[4] Saḥnūn b. Saʿīd, al-Mudawwanah, vol. 16 (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.), 112 | al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 26, 136.
[5] Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-Mujtahid, vol. 2, 402 | Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 8, 318.
[6] al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, vol. 6, 158 | al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ, vol. 20 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1997), 92.
[7] Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Siyāsah al-Sharʿiyyah (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1998), 123 | al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1985), 233.
[8] Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, vol. 11 (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah, n.d.), 95–96 | Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 8 (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2004), 315.
[9] Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā, vol. 11, 94–100.
[10] al-Ṭabarī, Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahāʾ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1999), 212–214 | Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Tamhīd, vol. 5 (Rabat: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 1967), 321.
[11] Abū Ḥanīfah held that: A Muslim is killed for killing a dhimmī under qiṣāṣ. This directly contradicts the literalist reading of the ḥadīth “A believer is not killed for a disbeliever.” – al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 7 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1986), 254, and al-Sarakhsi, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 26 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1993), 141.
[12] In classical fiqh, slaves (ʿabīd / mamlūk) were not independent legal agents (dhawū dhimmah kāmilah) but legally dependent members of a household (ahl al-bayt) under the authority (wilāyah) of the master.
al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 11 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1993), 137–139: Discusses the slave’s lack of independent legal capacity and placement under the master’s household authority.
Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 6 (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2004), 192–195: Treats slaves within the chapters of household dependents (ahl al-bayt) rather than autonomous persons.
Wael B. Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 286–289: Explains the household-based legal model underlying dependency in classical Islamic law.
[13] Classical jurists required legal parity (kafāʾah / musāwāh) between killer and victim for qiṣāṣ to apply. Where full equivalence was absent (free/slave, Muslim/non-Muslim in most schools), qiṣāṣ was replaced with other penalties.
Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-Mujtahid, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, n.d.), 401–404: Explicitly states that qiṣāṣ depends on equivalence in legal status.
al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 7 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1986), 253–255: Grounds qiṣāṣ in equality of legal inviolability (ʿiṣmah).
al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ, vol. 20 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1997), 85–87: Lists conditions for qiṣāṣ, including full legal equivalence.
[14] Ownership (milk al-yamīn) imposed positive legal duties, not merely control: maintenance (nafaqah), liability for harm caused by the slave, and responsibility to protect the slave from unlawful injury.
Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 8, 215–220: Affirms the master’s obligation of maintenance and responsibility for protection.
al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 24, 77–79: Discusses the master’s financial liability for torts committed by the slave.
Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Tamhīd, vol. 5 (Rabat: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 1967), 318–322: Establishes the obligation to protect slaves from harm and abuse.
[15] Bernard K. Freamon, Possessed by the Right Hand: The Problem of Slavery in Islamic Law (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 71–85 | Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughnī, vol. 8 (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2004), 311–320 | Jonathan A. C. Brown, Slavery and Islam (London: Oneworld, 2019), 39–55.
[16] Q.90:12–13 (freeing a slave described as a righteous ascent). Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, no. 1509: “Whoever frees a believing slave, Allah will free every limb of his from the Fire.” | al-Nawawī, Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, vol. 10 (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1972), 30.
[17] Q.4:92 (expiation for accidental killing), Q.58:3 (expiation for ẓihār), and Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-Mujtahid, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, n.d.), 335–338.
[18] Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, no. 1659: “Whoever strikes his slave or beats him unjustly, the expiation is to free him.” Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, no. 30: “Your servants are your brothers; feed them from what you eat and clothe them from what you wear.” | Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Fatḥ al-Bārī, vol. 5 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1379 AH), 171–172 | Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, al-Tamhīd, vol. 5 (Rabat: Wizārat al-Awqāf, 1967), 321–322.
Islam did not merely regulate an existing institution but progressively constrained it: expanding slaves’ legal rights, encouraging and ritualizing manumission, tying emancipation to moral atonement, and unequivocally condemning abuse and killing.a
[19] Ibn Kathīr, in his tafsīr of Q.5:45, reports that the majority of early scholars held that a Muslim is not executed for killing a disbeliever. However, this position was neither unanimous nor absolute. A number of scholars rejected it entirely, while others contextualized it, restricting its application to enemy combatants or those lacking legal protection. Where non-Muslims possessed dhimmah, treaty, or amān, many jurists, including Abū Ḥanīfah, affirmed qiṣāṣ on the basis of equal legal inviolability.
[20] al-Kāsānī, Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ, vol. 7 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1986), 254–256: Qiṣāṣ is denied where the victim lacks legal inviolability (ʿiṣmah), such as a ḥarbī.
al-Nawawī, al-Majmūʿ, vol. 20 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1997), 85–88: Distinguishes between combatants and protected non-Muslims.
[21] al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 26 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1993), 140–142: Holds that a Muslim may be executed for killing a dhimmī due to equal legal protection.
al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1985), 230–232: Treats dhimmīs as protected legal subjects whose blood is inviolable.
[22] al-Shāfiʿī, al-Umm, vol. 4 (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, n.d.), 247–249: Differentiates between muʿāhad, mustaʾmin, and ḥarbī in qiṣāṣ rulings.
Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 28 (Riyadh: King Fahd Complex, 1995), 334–336: Affirms that treaty-bound non-Muslims possess full blood protection.
[23] Justice (ʿadl) in Islam is inseparable from personal moral responsibility before Allah (ﷻ), regardless of whether worldly punishment applies.
Q.99:7–8: “Whoever does an atom’s weight of good shall see it, and whoever does an atom’s weight of evil shall see it.”
al-Ghazālī, al-Mustaṣfā, vol. 1 (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 1997), 286–289: Establishes taklīf (moral accountability) as foundational to justice.
Ibn Taymiyyah, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, vol. 8 (Riyadh: King Fahd Complex, 1995), 458–460: Distinguishes between divine accountability and judicial enforcement.
[24] Q4:58: “Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people, judge with justice.”
al-Qarāfī, al-Furūq, vol. 2 (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1998), 103–107: Explains procedural justice and the role of courts.
Ibn Farḥūn, Tabsirat al-Ḥukkām, vol. 1 (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyyāt al-Azhariyyah, 1986), 12–20: Classical manual on judicial process and legal adjudication.
[25] Islamic justice recognizes context (ḥāl, ʿurf, maqṣad) and does not apply rulings mechanically.
Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn, vol. 3 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1996), 3–5: “Legal rulings change with time, place, circumstance, and intention.”
al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt, vol. 2 (Cairo: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1997), 302–305: Grounds justice in maqāṣid, not literalism.
[26] Justice aims at public welfare (maṣlaḥah), deterrence, and preservation of social order.
Q.5:32: “Whoever kills a soul… it is as though he has killed all of mankind.”
al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1985), 219–225: Justice as a mechanism for social stability and protection.
Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Siyāsah al-Sharʿiyyah (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1998), 13–15: Punishment and governance exist to protect society, not merely retaliate.
Justice in Islam is not exhausted by penal outcomes; it encompasses moral accountability before Allah (ﷻ), structured legal process, context-sensitive rulings, and the protection of society through deterrence and public welfare.
Qur'anic misconceptions addressed 