Explanations of the modernists regarding the Maqaasid al-Shariah (higher objectives theory): A critical study (1) by Dr. Sultan al-Umayri.

The modernist doctrine is based on what they call unquestionable principles and they propose that belief in these principles is mandatory for everyone to adopt and anyone who does not believe in these, then they are severely reprimanded by them.

The most important of these principles is the historical origin principle which means that all events, actions, and texts have an origin, place, time and rules; these ideas and terminologies are applicable for all times, however, they are subject to evolution and reuse.

This principle is at the top of the pyramid of the modernist doctrine and is considered the deepest and most sacred factor of knowledge.

For this reason, the modernist discourse continues to strive to establish a historical view of dealing with Islamic law and the tradition that exists around it, rather than the absolute view of religious thought.

The modernist discourse does not hide the fact that it finds it very difficult to establish that view in the contemporary Arab mind. For this reason, it often resorts to intellectual evasion. Instead of dealing with the (Islamic) heritage, as if it is something alien and unrelated to them, they try to look for something that relates to the tradition to build their own historical view upon it. Such an attempt is considered a big change in their ways and reveals a large part of the crises of defeat experienced by the Arab modernists.

They have been using Maqasid to look for their modernist discourse within the Shariah and tradition in order to establish an intellectual history of their approach and its origins, and details of its provisions.

The reader, when he/she comes across these theories, is interested and aroused with the modern product which is packaged with extensive usage of the term Maqasid and extensive usage of the concepts to which the term in this package belongs to. This leads to broad interest in the theory and receives a great celebration in the intellectual forums, dialogues, and gatherings.

The modernist discourse, after taking the Maqasid theory as reference, starts neglecting the details of Shariah as well as the duties that the Muslims are required to perform. They conclude that the provisions of the Shariah are only to achieve the objectives; they serve as the means for the end; the provisions of the Hudood are only there to deter the perpetrators of sin and to achieve the purpose of justice and prevent the exploitation of the weak; therefore, in the detailed provisions of the law, they do not carry any value in and of themselves; what the value they carry is the achievement of their objectives. Hence, they argue that, if the objectives are achieved through other means, there is no need for it (i.e. Shariah stipulated laws) and no justification for its continuation and that this provision is comprehensive and inclusive of all the acts of worship. The Shariah only came to achieve some objectives in an era, i.e. the Prophet’s (ﷺ) era and the bottom line is that it is only a means to the end.[1]

To be more disciplined and to be further fair, we mention some of the statements from the modernists to convey what they actually state:

One of those most interested in Maqasid theory is Abdul Majeed al-Sharafi. He says that Shariah is in crises in current modernity and that there is no way out of this crises except by disposing off all of the specifics that do not take into account the change in environment, history, and time and place. He clarifies that such disposing off could be achieved by a number of ways including the following:

ضرورة التخلص من التعلق المرَضِي بحرفية النصوص – ولا سيما النص القرآني – وإيلاء مقاصد الشريعة المكانة المثلى في سَنِّ التشريعات الوضعية التي تتلاءم وحاجات المجتمع المعاصر

There is a need to get rid of the attachment to the disease of the literal text, especially the Qur’anic text, and to give Maqasid al-Shariah its due place in the enactment of beneficial legislation that suits the needs of contemporary society.[2]

He calls to:

قلب المسلَّمة التي استقرت في الوجدان الإسلامي من القرن الثاني للهجرة، وإلى الإقرار بأن العبرة ليست بخصوص السبب ولا بعموم اللفظ معاً؛ بل في ما وراء السبب الخاص واللفظ المستعمَل له يتعين البحث عن الغاية والمقصد

Change the heart of the Muslims i.e. to change their way of thinking, about the Shariah, which is still trapped in second Islamic century, and to recognize that the lesson is not behind the cause (i.e. reason for revelation) nor of the entire sentence together (i.e. the Nass) but behind the special purpose; the wording used is for the reader to ponder over for the purpose and extent.

Then he derives the conclusion and says:

وفي هذا البحث مجال لاختلاف التأويل بحسب احتياجات الناس واختلاف بيئاتهم وأزمنتهم وثقافتهم

In this discussion, there is an opportunity to arrive at different interpretations based on the people’s needs according to their environments, cultures and eras.[3]

As a result of this, he arrives at the conclusion to abolish the necessity of all the great acts of worship in Islam: from prayer, fasting, Zakat (obligatory charity) and Hajj (pilgrimage) on the grounds that the Shariah came to benefit the interests of that era and that its objectives have been achieved through achieving justice by other means and hence we do not need the Shariah and its specifications.[4]

Hassan Hanafi makes Maslaha (benefit) as the primary source or purpose of legislation and the basis behind which the texts of the revelation are tied. He says:

تقوم مصادر التشريع كلها… على مصدر واحد هو المصلحة باعتبارها المصدر الأول للتشريع؛ فالكتاب يقوم على المصلحة، والسنة أيضاً تقوم على المصلحة

The sources of legislation are all based on Maslaha as the primary source of legislation; the Book (i.e. Qur’an) is based on Maslaha, and the Sunnah is also based on Maslaha.[5]

He also says:

كما يؤوَّل النقل لصالح العقل في حالة التعارض، كذلك يؤول النقل لصالح المصلحة في حالة التعارض

If the aql (intellect) contradicts the naql (i.e. text of Qur’an and Sunnah), then we should explain (the contradiction) according to the intellect. Likewise is true for the Maslaha; we explain according to the benefit whether it has been contradicted or not.[6]

He does not distinguish between definitive and other texts; everything is included under Maslaha.

Al-Jabri criticizes the work of the jurists and describes them as preoccupied with the linguistic issues of Maqasid al-Shariah, and criticizes the jurists who ruled in accordance with it. He calls for changing this so that the ruling revolves around the Maslaha and nothing else. For instance, he forbids usury in some instances and bank investments asserting that it should be ensured that they are free of exploitation. This is confirmed by his statement:

ومعلوم أن منه الاستغلال هو الحكمة من تحريم الربا

It is known that exploitation is the wisdom behind the prohibition of usury.[7]

As for Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, he believes that the religious thought suffers from the control of the ‘idea of sanctity of the religious text’ and that he deals with it as crossing the limits of the situation in which it is formed, and believes that the solution is to eliminate the authority of the religious text; replacing the historical view, in dealing with the beliefs and legislations, can be achieved through reflection of the purposes of dealing with the religious texts, as, in his view, was done by Umar b. al-Khattab (رضي الله عنه).[8]

The modernist discourse’s praise of the Maqasid theory as the reference point to Islamic legislation, which can maintain the spirit of Islam in the era of modernity, is through which the scholars (modern day mujtahideen) can abrogate what has become irrelevant; moreover, they can get rid of the power of religious texts because they say that they are free in Islamic legislation to change the features of its map based on what they see as Maslaha.[9]

We do not want the reader of the Noble Qur’an to initiate a judgment on this theory as soon as it is read; it is not the correct intellectual way of dealing with the modernist call to arbitrate the theory of Maqasid by either adopting or rejecting it in a rush, or to judge them by it incorrectly. We turn to this theory by means of analysis and by bringing up a methodology that takes into account the mental necessities, historical evidence, and cognitive requirements.

If we do so, we clearly discover that it suffers from profound cognitive problems and methodology that result in a great imbalance in its structure and a cognitive breakdown in its existence. In order that the reaction or response (to it) is not limited to an isolated case, which is supported by reality, these issues need to be described.

These problems have taken many forms; some of which are due to the deduction reached, and some of these are due to the mechanism on which the theory is based, including due to the mentality that deals with the evidences and examples.

These problems are illustrated by the following matters:

The first matter: The mercurial concept: Despite the importance that has been given to the Maqasid theory by the modernists, they have not provided the readers a clear meaning of it which makes it better than the religious text and in a superior and commanding position to the religious text. They have not given any proofs about this nor provided any guidelines that clarify its limitations or characteristics and how to use it properly. There should be at least some major efforts out there clarifying the dimensions of the theory and detailing the reasons why it should be the reference point of the text.

Let us wonder: did the modernist discourse carry out these great tasks in a way that meets the methodological tasks?

When we read their writings, we mostly find a repetition of the importance of Maqasid, the demand for how it should be a judge for the texts and the need for the texts to submit to it. However, they did not build an integrated system or a base that clarifies everything about the theory, about its limits and controls, about its principles and one that removes confusion and ambiguity about its sections and categories, and the real actual criterion. Which Maslaha should be taken into account and what are its conditions? What are the controls? What are their limits? Who can do that? How to answer those who oppose the idea? All these questions on the methodology have no answers in the modernist product.

The benefits demanded by the modernists are mercurial and loose, with no identity, no meaning, no entity, and no borders. This is what Hassan Hanafi said about the Maqaasid:

أمور إضافية تختلف باختلاف الأفراد والأحوال والظروف، وربما العصور والأزمان

Additional matters vary according to individuals, conditions, circumstances, and perhaps even eras and times.[10]

Is it acceptable to reason that something is claimed to be superior to the texts but at the same time, is neglected and remains without explanation or clarification? Is it acceptable to leave the legal texts clear in their significance and evidence in their wording consistent in their meanings, and subject it to a concept that is unclear and lacks specifics?

Had the modernist discourse been committed to the correct methodology, it would have proceeded to carry out the necessary cognitive tasks, but it has failed to do so.

If we compare the interaction of jurists and fundamentalists (usuliyyeen) with the modernist ways of dealing with the theory of Maqasid, we find that the jurists absorbed all the functions required by the Maqasid; they endeavored to explain the nature and concept, and studied the history and stages, and examined their categories and various forms, and detailed the order and classification and explained the importance, and established evidences on rational, historical, and textual basis. They also clarified the benefits and impacts and this took them hundreds of pages.

On the other hand, the modernist discourse has not done any of this, even though the status of Maqaasid is greater and more important in their approach as opposed to the jurists.

Does this not indicate a significant lapse in their methodology of research, and neglect of cognitive duties which leads to imbalance in the theory resulting in undisciplined and inconsistent approach in itself? Isn’t this negligence on the part of modernists indicative of a lack of respect and lack of appreciation of the awareness of the Arab mind?

It must be emphasized that the problem is not the need to consider the Maslaha or its importance, nor its relation with the Shariah since this case has been one of the clear necessities; it is one of the principles of the fuqaha and the usuliyyeen. The actual problem is related to its controls, identifications, and standards.[11] All these things were sidelined and overlooked in the modern discourse.

This systematic neglect, which has emerged in the form of the use of modernist discourse with Maqasid, is reflected in many instances. The ambiguity and reliance on vague and mercurial terms has become a prominent feature of theirs. Complaints from these issues have even come from some of the same discourse.[12]

The Muslim mind cannot accept such modernistic loose and vague approach to Maslaha because it inevitably leads to flaw in Shariah based rulings, it leads to dissolving the limits laid down by the Shariah for its provisions and also leads to contradiction of what has been agreed upon by the honorable companions and the entire Islamic nation throughout its history; changing the Shariah according to such varying Maqasid eventually results in the melting of the identity of Islam itself leading to diversity of rulings and loss of its features.

It is also necessary to emphasize that the demand for disclosure of the Maslaha and the clarification of its limits and controls is not only specific to Maslaha or to the modernist discourse; it is general in all the systematic approaches that are attributed to it in the study of Shariah. We rely on these texts in a disciplined manner, and whoever asks us to rely on consensus or analogy, we cannot accept his words until he reveals what he calls to and what are the limitations he has set.

The second matter: The severe reduction: It is very common in the modernist approach to see that they have very well narrowed down the concept of the nature that is being claimed as better than Shariah or the claim that Shariah is subject to it. Pondering over the nature of Maslaha advocated by the modernist discourse, one finds that the predominant character is the material nature, i.e. the Maslaha pertaining only to material life such as preservation of wealth and daily affairs or the Maslaha pertaining to tangible benefits only. These benefits are undoubtedly intended in the Shariah but they overlook the moral benefits which pertain to spiritual, psychological, and other aspects while also neglecting the non-apparent benefits related to human psyche and human societies.

The reason behind the modernist reduction of the theory of Maqasid is that they do not make specific the religious texts but only care about the generics; if we go back to the approach of the jurists and the usuliyyeen, we find confirmation of a number of scholars that Shariah is interested in clarifying the Law Maker’s objectives that are desired to be achieved.

This is also confirmed by the rational mind as well; since the Maqasid are a central issue in Shariah, it is rationally unlikely that the texts do not contain statements or verses to clarify them. The Shariah has specified the details of the provisions and this necessarily requires that the text or reference be submitted to its original and subsidiary purposes. Scholars like al-Shatibi and others, made sure that the way of knowing the Maqasid is the Shariah itself.

If we return to the legal texts (the Book and Sunnah) to verify the nature of the Maqasid on which the legal rulings were based, we find that they include both types (material and moral benefits) in a balanced manner and do not differentiate between them, but express them clearly, and established both weight and importance in their details.

Among the legitimate examples in which the moral benefits stand out include the statement of Allah:

اتْلُ مَا أُوْحِىَ إِلَيْكَ مِنَ الْكِتَـبِ وَأَقِمِ الصَّلَوةَ إِنَّ الصَّلَوةَ تَنْهَى عَنِ الْفَحْشَآءِ وَالْمُنْكَرِ وَلَذِكْرُ اللَّهِ أَكْبَرُ وَاللَّهُ يَعْلَمُ مَا تَصْنَعُونَ

Recite, [O Muhammad], what has been revealed to you of the Book and establish prayer. Indeed, prayer prohibits immorality and wrongdoing, and the remembrance of Allah is greater. And Allah knows that which you do. [Q.29:45]

This is an indication that the purposes of prayer are related to the moral and abject meanings, including due to the apparent material meanings.

Another example is the saying of Allah:

خُذْ مِنْ أَمْوَلِهِمْ صَدَقَةً تُطَهِّرُهُمْ وَتُزَكِّيهِمْ بِهَا وَصَلِّ عَلَيْهِمْ إِنَّ صَلَوَتَكَ سَكَنٌ لَّهُمْ وَاللَّهُ سَمِيعٌ عَلِيمٌ

Take, [O, Muhammad], from their wealth a charity by which you purify them and cause them increase, and invoke [Allah’s blessings] upon them. Indeed, your invocations are reassurance for them. And Allah is Hearing and Knowing. [Q.9:103]

This verse indicates that one of the purposes of Zakah is a moral one, which is to cleanse and purify oneself.

For example, the Prophet (ﷺ) said:

تَعَالَوْا بَايِعُونِي عَلَى أَنْ لاَ تُشْرِكُوا بِاللَّهِ شَيْئًا، وَلاَ تَسْرِقُوا، وَلاَ تَزْنُوا، وَلاَ تَقْتُلُوا أَوْلاَدَكُمْ، وَلاَ تَأْتُونَ بِبُهْتَانٍ تَفْتَرُونَهُ بَيْنَ أَيْدِيكُمْ وَأَرْجُلِكُمْ، وَلاَ تَعْصُونِي فِي مَعْرُوفٍ، فَمَنْ وَفَى مِنْكُمْ فَأَجْرُهُ عَلَى اللَّهِ، وَمَنْ أَصَابَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ شَيْئًا فَعُوقِبَ بِهِ فِي الدُّنْيَا فَهْوَ لَهُ كَفَّارَةٌ، وَمَنْ أَصَابَ مِنْ ذَلِكَ شَيْئًا فَسَتَرَهُ اللَّهُ فَأَمْرُهُ إِلَى اللَّهِ، إِنْ شَاءَ عَاقَبَهُ، وَإِنْ شَاءَ عَفَا عَنْهُ

Come along and give me the pledge of allegiance that you will not worship anything besides Allah, will not steal, will not commit illegal sexual intercourse will not kill your children, will not utter; slander, invented by yourself, and will not disobey me if I order you to do something good. Whoever among you will respect and fulfill this pledge, will be rewarded by Allah. And if one of you commits any of these sins and is punished in this world then that will be his expiation for it, and if one of you commits any of these sins and Allah screens his sin, then his matter, will rest with Allah: If He will, He will punish him and if He will,. He will excuse him.[13]

This Hadith speaks of the moral dimension in the purposes of the setting limits, contrary to the modernist view.

There are repeated intimations in the legal texts regarding wisdom behind the moral benefits, as stated in the obligation to fast, guidance in the Hajj, the prohibition of alcohol, and the need for retribution (Qisas) as a duty among others.

And this case makes it mandatory for anyone who wants to deal with Maqasid theory to take into account all the types of Maqasid to be achieved by Shariah, and they should be aware of the differences between the original and subsidiary purposes of worship, and when they do not have sufficient awareness of the differences between the two types, they fall in problems and defects towards injustice while dealing with balanced Shariah.

We see that al-Shatibi was aware of this fact and dealt with objectives of Shariah skillfully and said about the prayer:

لصلاة – مثلاً – أصل مشروعيتها الخضوع لله – سبحانه – بإخلاص التوجه إليه، والانتصاب على قدم الذلة والصغار بين يديه، وتذكير النفس بالذكر له. قال – تعالى -: {وَأَقِمِ الصَّلاةَ لِذِكْرِي} [طه: 14]، وقال: {إنَّ الصَّلاةَ تَنْهَى عَنِ الْفَحْشَاءِ وَالْـمُنكَرِ وَلَذِكْرُ اللَّهِ أَكْبَرُ وَاللَّهُ يَعْلَمُ مَا تَصْنَعُونَ} [العنكبوت: 45]، وفي الحديث: «إن المصلي يناجي ربه

The Salah – for example – its original reason is the submission to Allah – with sincerity, humility, and focused attention with a reminder to the soul to mention Him and remember Him. Allah says (interpretation of the meaning): Indeed, I am Allah. There is no deity except Me, so worship Me and establish prayer for My remembrance [Q.20:14]. Allah says: Indeed, prayer prohibits immorality and wrongdoing, and the remembrance of Allah is greater. And Allah knows that which you do [Q.29:45]. The Hadith says: When you pray you are talking confidentially to your Lord.

It has the objectives which include forbidding the indecency and vice, as well as a relief from the present life as in the report (where the Prophet (ﷺ) said): give us comfort by it, O Bilal. Also found in the Sahih (authentic): My comfort has been provided in Salah and he asked for livelihood. Allah says: And enjoin prayer upon your family [and people] and be steadfast therein. I ask you not for provision; I provide for you [Q.20:132]. In the Hadith commentary, this is the meaning, in addition to fulfillment of needs such as the prayer of Istikhaarah and prayer of need, and the request to obtain Paradise and escape from the Fire, which are general public benefits, and the fact that the worshiper is in the protection of Allah as in the Hadith: Whoever prays the morning prayer is still in the Protection of Allaah and to get higher status. Allah says: And from [part of] the night, pray with it as additional [worship] for you; it is expected that your Lord will resurrect you to a praised station [Q.17:79] making the night a sanctified place.[14]

This clearly distinguishes between the original Maqasid and the dependent Maqasid, and creates balance between the apparent and the non-apparent objectives.

Ibn Taymiyyah had cautioned early about the dangers of prioritizing material benefits to the detriment to spiritual and moral benefits; he warned of this as if he was predicting the modernist approach where he says:

وكثير من الناس يقصر نظره عن معرفة ما يحبه الله ورسوله من مصالح القلوب والنفوس ومفاسدها وما ينفعها من حقائق الإيمان وما يضرها من الغفلة والشهوة كما قال – تعالى -: {وَلا تُطِعْ مَنْ أَغْفَلْنَا قَلْبَهُ عَن ذِكْرِنَا وَاتَّبَعَ هَوَاهُ وَكَانَ أَمْرُهُ فُرُطًا} [الكهف: 28]، وقال – تعالى -: {فَأَعْرِضْ عَن مَّن تَوَلَّى عَن ذِكْرِنَا وَلَمْ يُرِدْ إلاَّ الْـحَيَاةَ الدُّنْيَا} [النجم: 29] {ذَلِكَ مَبْلَغُهُم مِّنَ الْعِلْمِ} [النجم: 30] فتجد كثيراً من هؤلاء في كثير من الأحكام لا يرى من المصالح والمفاسد إلا ما عاد لمصلحة المال والبدن. وغاية كثير منهم إذا تعدَّى ذلك أن ينظر إلى سياسة النفس وتهذيب الأخلاق بمبلغهم من العلم

وقوم من الخائضين في أصول الفقه وتعليل الأحكام الشرعية بالأوصاف المناسبة، إذا تكلموا في المناسبة وأن ترتيب الشارع للأحكام على الأوصاف المناسبة يتضمن تحصيل مصالح العباد ودفع مضارهم ورأوا أن المصلحة نوعان (أخروية ودنيوية): جعلوا الأخروية ما في سياسة النفس وتهذيب الأخلاق من الحكم، وجعلوا الدنيوية ما تضمن حفظ الدماء والأموال والفروج والعقول والدين الظاهر، وأعرضوا عما في العبادات الباطنة والظاهرة من أنواع المعارف بالله – تعالى – وملائكته وكتبه ورسله، وأحوال القلوب وأعمالها: كمحبة الله وخشيته وإخلاص الدين له والتوكل عليه والرجا لرحمته ودعائه وغير ذلك من أنواع المصالح في الدنيا والآخرة. وكذلك في ما شرعه الشارع من الوفاء بالعهود، وصلة الأرحام، وحقوق المماليك والجيران، وحقوق المسلمين بعضهم على بعض، وغير ذلك من أنواع ما أمر به ونهى عنه حفظاً للأحوال السنية وتهذيب الأخلاق. ويتبين أن هذا جزء من أجزاء ما جاءت به الشريعة من المصالح. فهكذا من جعل تحريم الخمر والميسر لمجرد أكل المال بالباطل؛ والنفع الذي كان فيهما بمجرد أخذ المال

Many people limit their view of knowledge to what Allah and His Messenger love from the purity of the heart and the self, and purge them from sins and they do not benefit from the reality of faith and what harms them from negligence and lust, as He, the Almighty, says: and do not obey one whose heart I have made heedless of My remembrance and who follows his desire and whose affair is ever [in] neglect [Q.18:28]. Allah also says: So turn away from whoever turns his back on My message and desires not except the worldly life. That is their sum of knowledge [Q.53:29-30]. You would find many of them do not look at the Maslaha and Mafasid except only when thinking of the financially beneficial or physical aspects. Many of them go beyond that so much so that they consider self-discipline, and ethics and behavior as the major core of knowledge.

Those who looked deeply into the fundamentals of jurisprudence (Usul al-fiqh) and the interpretation of the rulings of the Shariah in appropriate contexts; if they had spoken appropriately so that the order of the ways of rulings were dependent on the interests of the people and let go of their disadvantages and saw that the interest is two types (pertaining to afterlife and pertaining to this world): They made the afterlife as the policy of self and ethics from the rulings. They made the worldly aspect as inclusive of preservation of blood and wealth and what pertains to the mind and the apparent from the religion. They presented what is in the acts of worship whether secretive or visible from the knowledge of Allah, His angels, His Books (revelation), and His Messengers and the conditions of the heart and its actions: so the love of Allah and devotion to Him and sincerity in the religion for Him and trust upon Him are the types of benefits (Masaaleh) in this world and the Hereafter. Likewise, in what He legislated include adherence to covenants, maintaining blood relations, rights of slaves and neighbors and the rights of Muslims over each other, and other types of what He ordered and forbade to preserve the Sunnah based ethics and manners. It turns out that this is one of the parts of the Maqasid al-Shariah. This is why it is forbidden to consume alcohol and to indulge in gambling to earn unlawful wealth and the profit they had when they took the wealth.[15]

Ibn Taymiyyah, in this text, emphasizes the need for balance in the observance of Maqasid that the Shariah came with in order that one does not over-emphasize one to the detriment of the other.

Once again, if we compare the efforts of the fuqaha and the usuliyyeen with the efforts of the modernist project in the field of the Maqasid al-Shariah – public, private, material and moral – we find that the scholars have made great efforts and gone to great extents to search and explore the Maqasid of Shariah and were able to conclude on the different types of the Maqasid that the Shariah intends to achieve. We do not deny that their efforts may have errors and, at times, exaggerations, however, the reader reaches a mature understanding from their presentation in that it shows the importance of the legitimacy and the need to apply the provisions, its rules and its Hudood. The reader reaches to a clear and bright picture while in contrast, he sees the apparent shortcomings in the modern discourse in this case, which results in significant blunders in their research contrary to history which violates the text itself as well.

Indeed, Allah knows best.

References and footnotes:

[1] Al-Qira’atu al-Jadeedah lil-Nass al-Deeni, Abdul Majeed al-Najjar (pg. 69)

[2] Libnaat, al-Sharafi (pg. 162)

[3] Al-Islam bayn al-Risalata wa al-Tareekh, al-Sharafi (pg. 70)

[4] Al-Islam bayn al-Risalata wa al-Tareekh, al-Sharafi (pg. 59 onwards)

[5] Min al-Nass ila al-Waaqi’, Hassan Hanafi (488 -489/2)

[6] Hasaad al-Zaman (al-ishkalaat), Hassan Hanafi (pg. 76)

[7] Wajhatu nazar, Muhammad al-Jabri (pg. 61), also see binyat al-aql al-arabi (pg. 63)

[8] Mafhoom al-Nass, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid (pg. 104)

[9] See jam’in muqulatihim: al-almaniyoon wal-Qur’an, Ahmad al-Ta-aan

[10] Min al-nass ila al-waqi’, Hassan Hanafi (487/2)

[11] See: al-Ijtihad, al-Nass al-waqi’ al-Maslaha, Ahmad Raysooni and Muhammad Baarut (pg. 33), and Dawaabit al-Maslaha, al-Buti (pg. 141)

[12] See tafsir al-siyaasi lil-qadaya al-‘aqadiyah, Sultan al-Umayri (pg. 19)

[13] Sahih al-Bukhari 3892

[14] Al-Muwaafaqaat, al-Shatibi (142-143/3)

[15] Majmoo’ al-Fatawa, Ibn Taymiyyah (233-334/32)